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INTRODUCTION
In May 2015, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong highlighted that Southeast Asia had emerged as a
‘key recruitment centre’ for ISIS (Samuel, 2016). Addition-
ally, as written by Parameswaran (2015, para 3), Prime
Minister Lee also highlighted that, “The threat is no longer
over there; it is over here.” Eventually, terrorism threat has
been a serious issue for ASEAN member states within its
national security history. What is significant, however, is
the changing situation of the international sphere brings
on the possibilities of terrorism to establish a regional base
that would pose an extraordinary threat to the whole
ASEAN member states.
Jensen (2014b, para. 1) had pointed out that Southeast
Asia was the third most active region in the world con-
Fronting the Return of Foreign
Terrorist Fighters: the Rise and Fall of
ASEAN Border Cooperation to Com-
bat Non-Traditional Threats
Muhammad Suryadi, Fauzia Gustarina Cempaka Timur
Asymmetric Warfare Study Program
Universitas Pertahanan
Kawasan IPSC, Sentul, Bogor, Jawa Barat 16810, Indonesia
muhammad.suryadi@hotmail.com
Submitted: August 15, 2018; accepted: September 26, 2018
Abstrak
Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa pengaturan-pengaturan bilateral tidak lagi mampu mengatasi konvergensi ancaman non-tradisional, terutama
karena longgarnya perbatasan di wilayah Asia Tenggara. Dengan demikian, kerja sama dalam menjaga perbatasan maritim dinilai lebih efektif
dalam upaya perlawanan terhadap teroris. Artikel ini bertujuan mengamati ancaman non-tradisional yang berasal dari perbatasan maritim,
khususnya di wilayah tiga negara ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Filipina—yang telah menandatangani Kerangka Kerja Pertahanan dan
Keamanan pada tahun-tahun sebelumnya. Dari analisis Trilateral Meeting, dapat dilihat komitmen ketiga negara dalam menanggulangi FTF
yang sudah menjadi tantangan ketidakamanan di Kawasan ASEAN. Selanjutnya, tulisan ini mempertimbangkan efektifitas Perjanjian Trilateral
dalam memerangi ancaman non-tradisional termasuk terorisme.
Kata kunci: pejuang teroris asing, konter-terorisme, kerja sama keamanan, ancaman non-tradisional.
Abstract
This paper argues that bilateral arrangements among ASEAN countries are no longer enough to address the convergence of non-traditional
threats, primarily due to porous borders in Southeast Asia region. Hence, fighting terrorism by securing maritime border through ASEAN
border cooperation is seen as a useful measure to respond the issue. This paper aims to observe non-traditional threat posed from the
maritime boundary, specifically from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines border which each of the government has agreed on Defense
and Security Agreement Framework in the past few years. The FTF returnees and the existential threat of terrorism in each ASEAN countries
have eventually carried a new agenda for ASEAN countries in securing the border. This paper then analyses the result of the Trilateral Meeting
that depicts the commitment of these countries in tackling FTF as the growing security challenges in the region. This paper also considers the
effectiveness of the Trilateral Agreement in combating non-traditional threats including terrorism.
Keywords: foreign terrorist fighter, counter-terrorism, cooperative security, non-traditional threats.
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cerning terrorist attacks, with nearly 1200 attacks occur-
ring in the area. The vast majority of terrorist attacks oc-
curred during 2013 in two states of ASEAN members, the
Philippines and Thailand. The attacks in those countries
were accumulated and around 95% of the attacks occurred
by the year.
The terrorist in Thailand was primarily confined to the
southern part of the country, where some of the groups
have been waging a separatist war since the mid-2000s
(Jensen, 2014). Meanwhile, the terrorist in the Philippines
was dispersed broadly across the country and was driven
by a number of groups with various goals. For instance,
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) are sepa-
ratist groups based their movement on ethnicity and reli-
gion, while others contemporary terrorist groups, such as
Abu Sayyaf Group and Maute Group are more prominent
terrorist organizations driven by ISIS’s ideology with a
mission to create Mindanao as ISIS province in Southeast
Asia.
In Indonesia, the terrorist attacks are mostly conducted
by lone wolf terrorist. Lone wolf terrorism begins with a
combination of personal and political grievances which
form the basis of an affinity with other online sympathisers
(Hamm & Spaaj, 2015). The threat of lone wolf terrorism
occurred from the loose of controlling individual security
that vulnerably exposed by radicalisation. All those lone
wolves’ attacks use ordinary items, like cars and knives,
which make it hard to prevent. It is followed by the identi-
fication of an enabler, as well as by the announcement of
terrorist intent. This situation explains the terrorist attack
could also happen without any command and control from
the main base. Channel News Asia (2017) published an
infographic contained several incidents of terrorist attack
in Indonesia affiliated with ISIS, such as twin suicide bomb-
ing in East Jakarta; bomb attack and shooting in Bandung,
West Java; suicide bombing in Solo, Central Java; stab-
bing attack in Tangerang, Banten; as well as shooting and
bomb attacks in Jakarta that happened in 2016 until 2017.
Conceptually, ASEAN seems to be well suited to com-
bat the new non-traditional threats that affect the peoples
in the region. Earlier than another regional organisation,
in the late 1980s, ASEAN had adopted numerous com-
prehensive security decision, both for traditional and non-
traditional threats. Moreover, it has acknowledged that the
necessity to increase transnational collaboration and co-
operation to overcome challenges is at its peak through a
regional meeting. In May 2017, the battle of Marawi in the
Philippines has alarmed the member states to address ter-
rorism with the unity of ASEAN. Otherwise, the emerg-
ing of terrorism as a non-traditional threat capable of build-
ing a base in Southeast Asia will soon become a reality.
Katsumata (2009:2) on his book ASEAN’s Cooperative
Security Enterprise was analysing the significance of coop-
erative security through ASEAN and three non-ASEAN
countries, namely, China, the United States, and Austra-
lia by using a realist perspective. Hence, Katsumata’s ex-
planation stated that ASEAN approach emphasises dia-
logue and consultation with mutual understanding and
trust are said to be naive and did not offer any mechanism
to prevent or resolve the conflict. This paper is different
from Katsumata’s since it only implements the concept of
cooperative security among ASEAN member states, par-
ticularly cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
Nayar (2013) in Cooperative Security for South Asia
found the concept of cooperative security in the South
Asian context is rarely discussed. Given the complexity of
the hard security issues that divide various countries, dis-
cussion on these concerns at a regional level particularly
in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, has
been regarded as a contradiction to the regional coopera-
tion. Therefore, the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation charter is reluctant to any further discussion
on sensitive bilateral concern. Even outside of this forum,
there are particularly a few discussions at bilateral or mul-
tilateral levels on regional security concern. However,
Nayar’s research had proven that South Asia did not have
any regional security cooperation unlike Southeast Asia,
where numerous of regional security cooperation has been
established. Nayar’s research also put a broader context of
non-traditional threats such as terrorism, natural disaster,
and environmental change, as well as economic develop-
ment, instead of focusing on a single issue that become a
core of concern in South Asia countries, while differently,
this research paper put more specific explanation to con-
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temporary non-traditional threats. From the Nayar’s re-
search, it is concluded that the absence of such regional
dialogue on security issues has given a significant impact
on an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust in the
region.
The novelty of this paper is mainly the use of coopera-
tive security as a single concept to generate an operational
framework. This paper provides a condition where the
concept of cooperative security able to show its significance
exclusively among ASEAN member states. By using the
descriptive-analytical method, this paper will analyse fur-
ther by explaining terrorism cases in Southeast Asia as a
classical issue for most of the countries that need to be
seen through the unity. By agreeing to focus on terrorism
as a common threat in the region, this paper exposes the
necessity of common perspective from ASEAN member
states to be addressed in regional level, instead of only in
sub-regional level.
This paper aims to argue that terrorism as a non-tradi-
tional threat has not been addressed optimally in regional
level by ASEAN through collaborative cooperation. The
terrorist threat that keeps frequently coming as a national
concern of each ASEAN’s is perceived as a sensitive issue
which mostly dealt with sovereignty concern. Furthermore,
this paper also aimed to provide an operational framework
that eventually analyses the considerable problem of non-
traditional threat that is coming from the mobility of
people, as the terrorist method of recruitment and
radicalization involving the role of people mobility that
has not been given a concern. The research of this paper is
also conducted to show that the absence of a common
definition and agreement has hampered the solution to
offer an operational framework to combat terrorism in
more effective way.
This paper is urging ASEAN to re-reading terrorism as
a non-traditional threat that need to be addressed with
unity. The existence of terrorist in Southeast Asia during
the 50 years of ASEAN has not given any significant effect
on regional security. Currently, the terrorist group in In-
donesia and the Philippines sea border has shown the vast
impact on those countries. It indicates any effort and ac-
tion claimed to combat the threat have not given signifi-
cant changes. In addition, ISIS’s influence to a certain
terrorist group, FTF and lone wolf terrorist made a new
concern in combating terrorism needs to be increased. This
paper offers solutions for ASEAN member states to inte-
grate regional security as part of national resilience through
the operational framework in combating terrorism as a
common threat by using conceptual framework provided.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The advanced method of Cooperative Security em-
braces two concentric and mutually reinforcing ‘elements
of security’: Individual Security (inward) and Territory Sta-
bility (outward). Of these two elements, Cooperative Se-
curity model is a common commitment to protect indi-
vidual security and to promoting stability within a terri-
tory. This paper analyses that ASEAN can claim to effec-
tively operate in two elements of Cooperative Security
model through its system, values, and its member unity as
the basis of regional security and producing operational
framework as a guide to combat terrorism.
An idea that becomes a central concern within ASEAN
member states is state sovereignty, where other state mem-
bers are unable to involve in any situation unless it is de-
clared. However, the concept of state sovereignty cannot
be a screen to cover mass violations, or another threat to
human security which can take place with impunity such
as terrorism that recently occurred. Therefore, the
Westphalia concept of the absolute right of states sover-
eignty fit within their territories is no longer accepted con-
cerning the promotion of regional security.
Moreover, the component of Cooperative Security is
the active promotion of stability outside the boundaries
of the states that agree to establish the Cooperative Secu-
rity system (Cohen & Mihalka, 2001). Instability in areas
where the nearby location of the region of the Coopera-
tive Security system, or further afield, that might threaten
the security of its members will become a matter of seri-
ous concern. Stability may be overturned by the danger of
conflict between states, or even further by mass violations
toward individual security in neighbouring countries.
METHODS
The methodological approach utilised in this research
paper aims to combine a theoretical and factual under-
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standing of ASEAN and the cooperation to combat ter-
rorism as a non-traditional threat to the region. The meth-
odology is constructed on a historical narrative. As a re-
search practice, historical narration focuses on the descrip-
tion and interpretation of events (Moleong, 2014). The
historical narrative implemented in this paper has a cen-
tral subject on a specific aspect of terrorism history in
Southeast Asia and the ASEAN, and covers a period from
the few years. A historical approach is compulsory since
the cooperative security factor has been significant at dif-
ferent periods of ASEAN in terms of seeing terrorism as a
common threat. It is demonstrated that the characteristics
of cooperative security in ASEAN have influenced most
of their crucial moments and developments. Consequently,
the use of such method provides the reader with a com-
plete understanding of the role of each ASEAN’s member
states within both cooperative security regimes. The objec-
tive of this study is to propose an alternative perspective
towards ASEAN in responding to terrorism as a regional
concern through an integrated system of collective secu-
rity. This research is aimed not, however, to quantify the
significance of the cooperative security factors in ASEAN
simply because it is impossible to measure the relative im-
portance of this specific dimension on the cooperative
process.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
ASEAN AND ITS COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS
In 1967, ASEAN was established by five countries,
namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand. The establishment of this regional body is
aimed “to promote regional peace and stability through
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the rela-
tionship among countries of the region and adherence to
the principles of the United Nations Charter” (ASEAN,
para. 3) with the key concept called ASEAN way. It consti-
tutes the Southeast Asian pattern of diplomacy. It is a con-
sultative process that is mainly motivated by the will to
create a stable environment in the region (Antolik, 1990).
At a very first place, the scepticism of ASEAN as a re-
gional organisation which offer stability has been predicted
in various times. At the beginning of its birth in 1967, few
people thought it would last a decade since the two previ-
ous attempts; namely, The Association of Southeast Asia
and the MAPHILINDO (Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Indonesia) concept had ended only a few years after their
creation.
The failure of Southeast Asian former organisation was
not only the main concern of the scepticism. The Asian
financial crisis (1997–1998) and the global financial crisis
(2007-2012) eventually has led ASEAN gave little atten-
tion of its impact on regional security. Buszynski (1999,
para. 3) stated that the impact of an economy has further
affected security relations between states in Southeast Asia.
For instance, the Asian financial crisis has diverted the
attention of ASEAN from Cambodia’s political crisis and
has undermined regional efforts to respond to the prob-
lem effectively.
Consequently, the ASEAN way has been dynamically
changed from full respect to the principle of non-interfer-
ence into the concept of ‘enhanced interaction,’ where it
would allow qualified intervention upon the home affairs
of the ASEAN’s member. RYU (2008) explained that the
examination of the documents resulted from ASEAN
Ministerial Meetings in 1998 to 2004 had revealed the
change upon the strategic concept. Nevertheless, the alter-
ation of ASEAN’s concept in perceiving security discloses
the principle contradiction to ASEAN’s non-interference
as the existing identity. The mechanism of ASEAN to re-
form the current contradiction between its original iden-
tity and the urgency to intercede the home affairs of
ASEAN’s member will impact its future.
The following case such as, 1969 Malaysia–Philippines
problem over Sabah, 1975 US-Vietnam, 1979 Vietnam
invasion to Cambodia, the end of the Cold War, and 1997
the Asian financial crisis, are historical problems that had
created challenges for ASEAN. In addition, the border
clashes between Thai–Cambodian do not inspire the con-
fidence of ASEAN to promote regional peace and stability
through withstanding respect for justice and the rule of
law in the relationship among countries of the region.
Buszynski (1999, para. 5) pointed out that, “Simmering
rivalries and mistrust continue to worsen relationships
between Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand and Burma,
and Malaysia and Thailand.” However, today is a far cry
from the 1960s and 1970s, and there are grounds for opti-
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mism that these intra-ASEAN conflicts would not doom
the organisation. Moreover, in the meantime, ASEAN gives
a slight of hopes towards the future regionalism among
the world, after the crisis happens in the European Union
that ASEAN needs to take its problem into account within
its unique way.
As the financial crisis occurred in 1997 and criticism
upon the performance of ASEAN in countering regional
affairs of economic and political issues, ASEAN has formed
numerous policy to covers and tighten the loopholes.
Acharya (2013:1) explained that “ASEAN has eventually
realised that the created situation has urged its vision to
be upgraded in the meantime, to also cover economic,
political-security, and socio-cultural under communities.”
Thus it finally determined to adopt the charter as legal
form base to strengthen the compliance from its members
to achieve greater institutionalisation and consolidation.
Besides, ASEAN has performed several efforts by building
the most recent mechanisms and tools in managing con-
flict and collecting action upon the states member. More-
over, whereas ASEAN within 20 years of the presence fo-
cused on a certain range of matters, ASEAN’s role now
even has broadened rapidly (Acharya, 2013). It functions
now cover a variety of new transnational or non-traditional
security issues, one of them is counter-terrorism. Below is
the data of ASEAN response towards terrorism as a non-
traditional threat:
As shown in Table 1, ASEAN numerously has given its
response in combating terrorism. On the one hand, the
declaration and plan of action made have adopted actions
and conducted cooperation to address the issue. On the
other hand, from all results as stated in documents of
ASEAN there was no single common definition of terror-
ism to emphasise the direction of where the all the coop-
eration aims to. Therefore, the situation in Southeast Asia
is unable to be cleared from the threat of terrorism, al-
though many responses have been made.
Nevertheless, instead of establishing a strong base of
Table 1. ASEAN Response towards Terrorism
Place and Date Forum Outcome 
Bandar Seri Begawan, 
November 2001 
 7th ASEAN Summit of Meeting Declaration of Combating Terrorism 
Bandar Seri Begawan, August 
2002 
Meeting with Dialogue Partner Declaration of ASEAN-US Cooperation to Combat 
Terrorism 
Hanoi, June 2003 AMMTC Special Meeting of Terrorism Plan of Action Combating Terrorism 
Chiang Mai, August 2004 ASEAN Intelligence Chief Meeting and 
ASEANAPOL 
Intelligence Information Sharing 
Jakarta, July 2004 37th AMM and PMC Declaration (ASEAN-Russia, ASEAN-Australia) 
Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism 
Siam Reap, June 2005 5th Senior Officials Meeting on 
Transnational Crime 
Reaching Consensus to prioritize the areas of 
transnational crime in order; terrorism; illicit drug 
trafficking; trafficking in persons; and money 
laundering 
Phuket, July 2009 42nd ASEAN Foreign Ministers of Meeting Joint Communique of Coping with Global Challenges 
Clark, October 2017 Joint Statement of Special ADMM on CVE, 
Radicalization and Terrorism 
Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and 
international levels in combating terrorism 
(Source: adapted from asean.org, 2018)
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common perspective in combating terrorism, ASEAN has
expanded its institutional model into a wider area that
beyond Asia Pacific and East Asia region, such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asian Summit
(EAS), as well as ASEAN Plus Three (APT). As ASEAN’s
Secretary-General, Pitsuwan (2017, para. 2) has recently
observed, “ASEAN has emerged as the fulcrum of geopo-
litical stability in Asia.” Within five decades ASEAN has
increased its membership to be growth not only quantita-
tively, but also qualitatively by creating more communities
in responding the issue within its area. ASEAN realised
that as regional organizations it needs to strengthen the
partnerships along with all major countries as the dialogue
partners as well as with external parties. The following are
the examples of ASEAN’s efforts to strengthen its rela-
tions and cooperation in responding issues that requires
further cooperative dialogue and actions; namely, the
ASEAN Plus Three, the AS-JSCC, the ASEAN Defense
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, the ASEAN Political
and Security Community (APSC), and the ASEAN Re-
gional Forum (ARF). All those efforts have given contri-
bution upon the enhancement of mutual understanding
and strategic trust to achieve peace, stability, and develop-
ment cooperation with all countries regionally and inter-
nationally. Most essential, the centrality of ASEAN has
been recognised in the changing of regional building
(Sisoulith, 2017).
Kaur found that the Southeast Asian region has seen a
high level of predominantly intra-regional migration since
the 1980s (Larsen, 2010). International Organization for
Migration (IOM) has pointed out that these high levels of
people movement have been driven by various socioeco-
nomic and political push and pull factors operating
throughout the region (Larsen, 2010). This situation oc-
curred due to the heterogeneous region has a very strate-
gic position, particularly given the importance of sea routes,
coastal countries, and spacious land boundaries between
insular and peninsular Southeast Asia that make it vulner-
able and easily accessed due to porous borders. Therefore,
it has been easier for illegal migrant, illegal trafficker, as
well as terrorists to travel across from one to another place.
Particularly for terrorism that remains a sensitive topic,
since it hinges on sovereignty issues. The loosening of bor-
der control and the ignorance to coordinate action among
ASEAN members has made terrorist free to plan, exercise,
and conduct their assaults without control (Cabalza, para.
3). Likewise, the Philippines prohibits foreign forces from
directly engaging in actual combat on their land.
In 2017, ASEAN has turned 50 years and been through
several crises including territorial crisis between its mem-
bers. For instance, dispute between Indonesia and Malay-
sia on the sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan Island,
dispute border of Preah Vihear temple between Thailand
and Cambodia, dispute of sovereignty over Pedra Branca
between Singapore and Malaysia, dispute of the Philip-
pines retains a claim on the eastern part of Malaysia, and
the ongoing dispute of South China Sea among several
sovereign states within the region namely Brunei, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China
(ROC), Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
The current ASEAN’s status with its grown ten mem-
ber states had made ASEAN be situated itself at the heart
of regional architecture and successfully showing consid-
erable impact towards the peace and prosperity within
Southeast Asia (Oba, 2010, para.1). In addition, Oba (2010,
para. 1) stated that “the Association has been seeking
Southeast Asian integration, announcing the establishment
of the ASEAN Community, the first regional community
in Asia, in December 2015.” On the one hand, these
achievements which had been made by ASEAN are all
noteworthy. On the other hand, the future challenges to-
wards ASEAN have shifted onto non-traditional threat,
particularly foreign terrorist fighter.
The changing situation of the world since cold war has
raised countries’ awareness to put more concern in strength-
ening their security. Since September 11, 2001, the con-
cept of non-traditional security issues has become increas-
ingly common in almost all parts of world included in
Southeast Asia, both domestically and regionally: in the
policy and the research agendas of governments, in non-
governmental organisations, in academic circles, as well as
in the general public and the media (Wang, 2004). Tradi-
tionally, security has been defined in geopolitical terms
and confined to relationships among nation-states, deal-
ing with issues such as deterrence, the balance of power,
that lead to military strategy, capacity, and capability. How-
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ever, the non-traditional understanding of security has
increasingly focused on whether a given issue represents
an existential threat, typically to a state or non-state actor.
Non-traditional security issues are started by the increas-
ing of people mobility which has caused further concern
in transnational crime, foreign terrorist fighters, and refu-
gee as a core national security issues.
The process of ASEAN integration among its member
had faced various challenges, particularly when it comes
to security issue related to the territory. The sovereignty
and the ASEAN Way values of non-interference as a vital
principle are eventually making regional security handi-
cap. This is one of the influential factors why the terrorist
conundrum has lasted so long in ASEAN countries.
Cabalza (2017, para. 7) stated that, “despite tactical and
operational support from ASEAN neighbours and major
powers to combat terrorists, military cooperation at the
ASEAN level remains limited due to the member-states’
sensitivities and national sovereignty concerns, such as
different approaches to national defence and cooperation,
as well as different levels of development, equipment, and
operational procedures that reflect the region’s inherent
complexities.”
DEFINING TERRORISM HELPS FINDING EFFECTIVE COUNTER-
TERRORISM APPROACH
The definition of terrorism has not gained any univer-
sal acceptance due to the different perspective of every
state national interest. The Philippines in Republic Act
no. 9372 stated any person who commits an act punish-
able under any of the following provisions of the Revised
Penal Code: Piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas
or in the Philippines water; rebellion or insurrection; coup
d’état; murder; kidnapping and serious legal detention; and
crimes entailing ruination through planning, making a
situation to be escalated and cause massive fear as well as
creating panic within the population, in order to expose
threat towards the government (IAG, 2017).
Lao PDR in Art. 8 Law on Anti-Money Laundering
and Counter Financing of Terrorism defined Terrorist as
a natural person, a group of people, an organisation or a
terrorist organisation that commit an act as defined in
Article 7 of this law. Meanwhile, Article 84 of the Crimi-
nal Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as quoted
by Vinh (2017) defined terrorism as a form of violation
that purposely aimed to destroy both life and physical
health of a person and the government. Furthermore, it is
also perceived as one of the actions which destabilise for-
eign relations of Vietnam towards other countries where
it has relations with the act of terrorism.
Apart from the various definition made by those coun-
tries, the ASEAN states have in recent years formulated a
common rhetorical position and indicated their willing-
ness to work together to combat terrorism. Joint declara-
tion has included the Declaration on Joint Action to
Counter Terrorism issued in November 2001 and a sec-
ond Declaration on Terrorism signed at the ASEAN sum-
mit in Phnom Penh in early November 2002. December
1997, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Trans-national
Crime (AMMTC) was set up and brings together the re-
spective home ministers and constitutes the core of
ASEAN’s counter-terrorism collaboration. However, the
more recent AMMTC meetings have been disappointing,
failing to contribute to the fight against terrorism. Their
joint communiques readopted well-known rhetorical mea-
sures. It is thus not surprising that many of responses made
by ASEAN towards terrorism are mostly made by a sub-
ASEAN level, such as through bilateral or trilateral agree-
ments.
Combating terrorism requires a thorough analyses and
assessment from counter-terrorism agencies, inter-agency
coordination, intelligence sharing, improved institutions,
and enhanced military capabilities that demand all ASEAN
countries to cooperate and coordinate further in a firm
way, such as on agreement, treaties, or more specifically
sub-region cooperation. Fronting various problems in the
contiguous-border area will require strong commitment
by concerned states, such as foreign terrorist fighters issue
need to be handled by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phil-
ippines in Sulu and Celebes Sea.
Through security perspective, the Sulu and Celebes Sea
or also known as tri-border area that link Indonesia, Ma-
laysia and the Philippines lies as challenges as well as the
potential opportunities for greater multilateral coopera-
tion among three countries. On the one hand, the Celebes
Sea opens southwest through the Makassar Strait, which
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is increasingly used by large crude oil tankers that could
not pass the shallower route in Strait of Malacca. Even
though the number of global trades passing through the
tri-border area is considerably less than the number pass-
ing through the Strait of Malacca, yet it is nonetheless sub-
stantial. In 2015, for instance, more than 100.000 ships
and 18 million passengers passed through the Celebes and
Sulu Sea, with a cargo value of around $40 billion. Be-
sides, trade among the tri-border states is also growing.
Worldview Startfor (2016, para. 5) found out that, “the
Philippines, for instance, depends on Indonesia for 70
percent of its coal imports, valued at approximately $800
million.”
On the other hand, the massive flow of trade through
these waters has allowed such practices to persist, provid-
ing funds for militant and organized crime groups, namely
Abu Sayyaf Group. Wallis (2017, para. 3) pointed out that,
“the Sulu and Celebes area is the world’s fastest growing
piracy hotspot under Abu Sayyaf Group with violent at-
tacks on commercial vessels and their crews, and an in-
creasingly successful kidnap and ransom business model
that mostly coming from ASEAN Countries citizens it-
self.” Table 2 are the recent actions of terrorism conducted
by Abu Sayyaf Group.
The growing number of cases occurs in Sulu and
Celebes Sea has given the terrorist a clear picture that the
tri-border has not been strongly protected by Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines in any form of security co-
operation and has offered an opportunity for them to
spread and connect each other transnationally. However,
this problem has not been seen as a crucial concern that
needs to be addressed immediately as it became a classic
case among ASEAN countries.
In fact, the growing influence and aspirations of ISIS
been able to exert in Southeast Asia, is both significant
and great concern. The January 2016 attacks in Jakarta;
the growing number of citizens in this region who find
their way to Syria and Iraq to participate in the conflict;
the rising number of FTF returning to the region to ‘bring
back the war to the home front;’ the increasing number of
terror groups pledging bai’ah to ISIS and finally the estab-
lishment and growing prominence of Katibah Nusantara
or the ‘Malay Archipelago Unit for the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria in Southeast Asia region;’ a component of
ISIS staffed solely by personnel from Indonesia and Ma-
laysia, are some of the indicators of ISIS’s influence in
Southeast Asia (Samuel, 2016). The main current crisis is
the Maute Group who pledged allegiance to IS Caliph Abu
Table 2. Abu Sayyaf Group Terrorism Activity within Sea Border
No. Year Case 
1. 2000 Kidnapped 20 hostages from Malaysian resort: Malaysian government employees, a police officer, a Filipino 
hotel worker and tourists from France, Germany, South Africa, Lebanon and Finland. 
2. 2011 Australian national Warren Richard Rodwell was abducted from his residence in Ipil, Mindanao and held for 
ransom until 2013 
3. 2012 A Swiss and a Dutch were kidnapped near the Tawi-Tawi Islands 
4. 2014 The group killed at least 21 Muslims celebrating the end of Ramadan on the Island of Jolo. 
Kidnapped two Germans in Palawan Province for six months 
5. 2015 A coast guard boat and crew were kidnapped and the captain was found beheaded. 
Abu Sayyaf beheaded Bernard Then, a Malaysian businessman kidnapped from a seafood restaurant inside 
Malaysia. 
6. 2016 Indonesian sailors were abducted from the Brahma 12 tugboat and the Anand 12 barge in the waters off the 
southern Philippines in March. 
(Source: Hume & Kathy, 2016)
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Bakr al-Baghdadi in April 2015. Since their current loca-
tion presence is at Lanao del Sur Province, the group then
labelled themselves ‘IS Ranao,’ where it was implied upon
the archaic title of the place (Franco, 2017).
Regardless the fear and panic exposed by numerous
groups of terrorist within Southeast Asia region, such as
in Indonesia during 2000’s when the bombardment at-
tack occurred in Bali and Jakarta, has shown the status of
the regional security was eventually at risk (Acharya, 2013).
Nowadays, the changing of terrorism nature to be modern
terrorism is perceived as transnational threat by most coun-
tries, since the capability of radical groups shown in build-
ing plan as well as and executing it into targeted countries.
It also exhibit surprising cases, acting across states, funds
laundering and other types of support sent by its world-
wide connection. However, looking back to the efforts by
ASEAN member states, after a period of hesitancy, it can
be said there are advance improvements where numerous
forms of cooperation with two or more countries intra-
ASEAN and extra-ASEAN, such as intelligence sharing
and counter-terrorism cooperation which were taken in
responding the regional issues as common threat that are
on top of ASEAN agenda and priority (Acharya, 2013).
In responding the influence of ISIS towards Southeast
Asia terrorism, it is necessary to provide a proper perspec-
tive. ASEAN member states should bear in mind that there
is a presence of ‘ISIS Southeast Asia’ threat, where ISIS at
the main part officially announced its interest in any South-
east Asian country. For the most part, the existence of ISIS
in Southeast Asia is strongly showed by the radical groups
as well as any individuals who have performed bai’ah of
allegiance upon ISIS. In other words, the ISIS case is some-
how overlapped with the local jihadis’ aim and vision.
Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) found that this situation
to be explained through integrated model approach where
according to this model, individuals are searching for mean-
ing and sense to their life and commitment into very tied
groups like terrorist organisations fills this need of being
part of something, making worth their living.
Therefore, it suggests further action and consideration
as a consequent of the appeal of ISIS in Southeast Asia
that create different approach depending on the country.
For instance, in Malaysia and Singapore, it has mostly been
the eschatological ideology and theology of ISIS that be-
come the main reason of allegiance. While in Indonesia,
the effect of ISIS covers on religious appeal. Moreover,
other reasons have also been cited to explain this situa-
tion, for instance kinship networks and loyalties, group/
personal rivalries, personal and pragmatic interests towards
ISIS. Thus, the terrorism pattern in Indonesia is consider-
ably more complex and variegated compared to other
Southeast Asian countries.
However, in the southern Philippines, groups that have
long engaged in violence for political and criminal rea-
sons are now claiming allegiance to ISIS. Although
Khatibah Nusantara was originally built in Syria as the
ISIS wing within Southeast Asian, not all FTF came to the
place have ever joined it. For example, compare to uniting
their groups along with the Indonesian-led Khatibah, nu-
merous of Malaysians are indicated become the fighter
together with Tunisian, French, and Algerian orderrian
FTF (Liow). The similar cause factor for this was resulted
from contention and dispute upon the leadership that was
taught by Indonesian.
An ending fact came up according to the critical issue
of foreign fighters returning to Southeast Asia. Given how
Asians terrorist involved in Afghanistan’s war facing the
Soviet Union in 1980 as well as 1988, the fighters who
survived then came to their homes with high dignity as for
being a group of experienced fighters in Southeast Asia
(Hashim, 2015). In addition, the plan of hardened a group
of terrorists returning from the similar situation such as
also from Syria, they carry along the ideology, operational
knowledge, as well as precious experience at mount war to
be practically implemented in each of their home coun-
tries. This condition is a potential threat that cannot be
ignored or even taken lightly by ASEAN.
Practically, the obstacle faced in Southeast Asia region
as a whole is the policing and governance of the sea bor-
der encompassing three areas, namely the Sulu Sea (Phil-
ippines), waters of Sabah (Malaysia), and the Celebes/
Sulawesi Sea (Indonesia). These porous and ungoverned
regions will worsen by the fact that the mobility of terror-
ist groups across borders is not under controlled (Liow).
At the current situation, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phil-
ippines, ASEAN states member initiated dialogue and
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exchange of intelligence as well as information in numer-
ous forms. In June 2017, these three countries reaffirmed
their governments’ commitment to effectively address ex-
isting as well as emerging transnational challenges and
threats resulting to agree on 15 points on Joint Statement
Trilateral Meeting among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Phil-
ippines that has been published on Indonesian Foreign
Ministry (Kemlu, 2017). This agreement theoretically has
covered some of the transnational issues that mostly faced
by the parties, they are: extremism, socio-economic, intel-
ligence and information sharing, terrorist financing, ter-
rorist networks in IT, illicit and arms smuggling, military
and law capacity training, religious leaders involved in
deradicalisation, as well as protection for victim, women
and children from terrorist threat.
However, the manifestation of cooperation needs to
be taken one or two steps further, to involve joint patrols
and where necessary, joint operations. On the one hand,
there is a huge expectation of the implementation of the
trilateral agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines could run up against rigid mindsets, obsolete
paradigms, and the perennial reluctance to compromise
sovereignty. On the other hand, none of ASEAN efforts
has given significant impact in reducing the number of
terrorist threats. Cooperation between agencies within the
various Southeast Asian governments specifically, between
the military, police, and intelligence could also be improved
through operational framework established from the com-
mon perspectives of all ASEAN member states. Through
this way the all ASEAN member states are believed could
contribute by way of military training programs, intelli-
gence data sharing, as well as the transfer of operational
knowledge.
The successful effort of the cooperation, however, needs
to be conducted through different strategy approach in
overcoming the non-traditional threat. ASEAN member
states should be realized that every issue has its own char-
acter that needs a compatible tool to be utilised. Given
the same case that has been made through Malacca Straits
Patrol initiated by Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia,
where only during several years of its launching the coop-
eration has been successfully decreased the number of pi-
racy and armed robbery in Malacca Straits. The key point
is laid on the construction process approach that utilised
to form the trilateral frameworks in facing the nature of
non-traditional threat, which makes it different with other
cooperation that mostly conducted by track-one diplomacy
in ASEAN. It was identified that the journey of Malacca
Straits Patrol such as Eyes-in-the-Sky was started in Shangri-
La Dialogue 2005 by involving not only government rep-
resentative but also intergovernmental organisations, se-
lected ocean law and maritime security experts and acade-
mician on the legality, justification and political implica-
tions of the initiative which considered as track-two diplo-
macy or non-traditional approach. This new way of diplo-
macy is preferred to address the issue of non-traditional
threat in ASEAN. The idea of constructing a framework
through track-one diplomacy or traditional approach be-
tween state-to-state relations in some points particularly in
ASEAN has somehow collided with the issue of sovereignty.
Thus the framework is occasionally dragged onto a point-
less discussion with no consensus. However, the execution
resulted from track-two diplomacy is necessary to be fol-
lowed-up by authorities involved in track one diplomacy,
in order to be officially agreed on behalf of the state’s policy.
The explanation given above is only an example of sharing
intelligence information as part of the framework in ad-
dressing non-traditional threat, the other security coop-
erative measures likewise in military and police coopera-
tion could also be raised through the equal scheme used
in establishing counter-terrorism efforts.
CONCLUSION
Terrorism existence in Southeast Asia is no longer con-
sidered as a recent threat that needs to be addressed as if it
is new by the member states. In many terrorism cases oc-
curred in Southeast Asia, there must be a lesson learned
as an input material to cope better in combating terrorism
in future. The reasons that hamper the process in ASEAN
is the member-states’ sensitivity and the concern of na-
tional sovereignty, such as different approaches to national
defence and cooperation, different levels of development,
equipment, and operational procedures that reflect the
inherent complexities of the region.
It needs to be realised that the growth and the emer-
gence of terrorist-affiliated transnationally in Southeast Asia
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occurred due to the disunity system that made this region
become a haven for the terrorist to be well connected.
Furthermore, the wide of the geographical condition of
Southeast Asian has made another challenge for states’
member in securing the area. The inability of ASEAN
member states to secure the border as unity has eventually
created a natural security border gap for people mobility
to cross because of particular reason; for instance, differ-
ent priorities of national concern, financial responsibility
to conduct a real-time patrol, as well as limited resource
and capacity. This uncontrolled situation has led terror-
ism to growth more fertile and taking granted where it
could also threaten the individual security as the target of
radicalisation.
The emergence of ISIS in Southeast Asia and the trac-
tion it generates, illustrates how resilient and evolutionary
the threat of terrorism has become. Because of this rea-
son, regional governments must remain vigilant to ISIS-
related developments, particularly pertaining the monitor-
ing of both returnees and communications between mili-
tants in Syria and their counterparts as well as followers
back home. They must equally be prepared to progress
with the threat concerning counter-terrorism strategies,
narratives, and cooperation. However, individual security
also plays a vital role in the emergence of terrorism. This is
an implication of the absence of optimisation security
border in the region where the loose of territory control
has led people mobility across border uncontrolled and
creates a haven for terrorist to be more developed. Thus,
the neglection of controlling and monitoring rapid people
mobility across border needs to be more pronounced in
term of individual security protection.
The operational framework aimed to be utilised as a
guide for combating regional terrorism. It further could
be implemented as regional security cooperation, particu-
larly for the regional organisation where most of the mem-
ber states are in developing countries. Since it is necessary
for these countries to realise the most fundamental con-
cern begin from individual security that mostly abandoned.
Moreover, it comes to a broader scope in which regional
security demands stronger commitment from the coun-
tries to fully implement the cooperative security. This op-
erational framework considered as a non-traditional way
to cope with terrorism in which non-traditional threat re-
quires a non-traditional approach to handle the issue.
Consequently, this research paper suggests that ASEAN
need to establish an operational framework based on a
mutual and common perspective of terrorism. The opera-
tional framework is designed to promote mainstreaming
and encourage activities from a long-term perspective. Its
particular objectives are the following: to raise awareness;
focusing on the definition of terrorism as a region threat
that also need to be addressed through regional way; to
encourage looking ahead; identifying a vision, priorities
and necessary processes for creating Southeast Asia as a
stable and peaceful region; to improve ASEAN member
states security capacity in order to achieve greater and bet-
ter collaboration in facing the future coming threats.
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